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Abstract. The subject of analysis in this article is the legal and fiscal role of currency 
transaction taxes in reducing the financial instability of the market. In that context, the 
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object, tax base, tax rate and tax incentives. The author discusses the requirements for the 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At the Millennium Summit in September 2000, the United Nations set out a vision of a 
global partnership for development, direction and achievement of certain global goals. 
Specifically, 189 member states adopted the UN Millennium Declaration on the "Millennium 
Development Goals".
1
 The specific objectives set forth in this Declaration pertain to reducing 
the number of poor people who are living in extreme poverty and ensuring sufficient 
quantities of clean drinkable water. The specific goals set forth in this document, which 
should be achieved by mid-2015, refer to increasing the level of education of the world 
population, upholding equality and preventing AIDS and other infectious diseases, and 
especially providing assistance to children with AIDS. The above Declaration is a great 
challenge. First of all, it represents the political will of the rich countries to provide the 
necessary flow of funds but it also includes the developing countries which have already 
used these funds in an efficient manner. Moreover, the implementation of the Declaration 
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represents a major intellectual effort of lawyers, economists and other scientists to 
understand the essence of the processes and global economic trends, which are used to 
achieve these goals. The intellectual challenge has multiple dimensions and significance, 
which gives rise to the question: whether the goals underlying these taxes be accomplished 
by means of national fiscal instruments, or whether there is a need to introduce new global 
taxes (Atkinson, 2009: 556-562). 
Since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration, many attempts have been made to 
investigate and determine financial arrangements that are necessary for its implementation. 
Thus, for example, at the global level, various reports specify that a conservative annual 
amount of 50 billion dollars is considered sufficient to achieve these objectives.
2
 The 
implantation costs were 66 billion dollars during 2006, with a tendency to be increased up to 83 
billion dollars in 2010; thus, it was realized that the proposed funds were insufficient.
3
 For this 
reason, the alternative ways of funding have been considered, some of which are taxes. There 
has been an growing emphasis on the importance of global environmental taxes, especially 
those aimed at taxing fuels (that contain carbon and that are directly or indirectly used in air 
travel) as well as taxes on international capital flows aimed at taxing foreign currency 
transactions, including a wide range of transactions such as spots, barter, derivatives and others 
(Landau, 2004: 110-111).  
When introducing new forms of taxation in domestic tax systems, we must always take 
into account the existing tax burden and the taxpayers’ feeling of already being overtaxed, 
in order not to break the boundaries of absolute tax limit. The phenomenon of “double 
dividend effect” which exists in environmental taxes is characteristic for taxes on foreign 
currency transactions. Given the political difficulties of introducing supranational taxes, 
the arising question is who will be subject to global public finance, viewed as the 
"nasciturus". For example, if the Euro-zone has introduced taxes on foreign exchange 
transactions, what would that mean for the euro-dollar ratios? With the introduction of 
global taxes, the "free user" problem would become more serious and the diffusion of tax 
would have a wider scope. When it comes to currency transaction taxes, the effect would 
depend on the availability of relocation financial activities (conditional on the scope of 
propagation of domestic tax jurisdiction). The larger volume of tax jurisdictions and higher 
revenues could be expected; yet, it should be noted that it is not necessary that all states 
participate in the incorporation of those taxes. Therefore, research on currency transaction tax 
should involve the introduction of tax on foreign exchange transactions in the euro area at a 
moderate tax rate, without considerate costs related to the degree of competitiveness. 
2. CURRENCY TRANSACTION TAXES: A BRIEF HISTORY 
Currency transaction taxes are based on the idea proposed by the famous economist John 
Maynard Keynes, who suggested introducing a small tax that would be applied to 
transactions in the London stock market (Keynes, 1936). The proposed tax would prevent 
the collapse of the London stock exchange and preclude the crisis similar to the one 
experienced in New York City during the Great Depression (1929-1933). Keynes makes a 
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clear distinction between the speculative and the normal business operations, considering 
that the former involved "gambling-like" transactions aimed at increasing one’s own wealth 
by taking advantage of special benefits, whereas the latter specifically involved financial 
transactions that serve the specific economic purpose. 
Currency transaction taxes are proportionally imposed in the course of exchanging local 
currency into foreign currency. Their introduction was proposed by a famous American 
economist James Tobin, as a specific way of “putting sand in the wheels of international 
finance”, for the purpose of slowing down its dynamics and reducing volatility in the market 
(Tobin, 1996: 112-128). The tax base would include the conversion of local currency into 
foreign currency, whereby the taxpayers are reported as participants in the foreign exchange 
market and taxes would be paid as additional costs on foreign currency transactions.
4
 Tobin 
justified his proposal to introduce this new tax by the existence of speculative transactions in 
the foreign exchange market, which is considered to be "a major cause of common 
frequency with the exchange rate crisis in the world" (Tobin, 1994: 215-267). Namely, 
besides a series of comparative advantages, the high mobility of capital in the financial 
market entails serious disadvantages, which are reflected in the frequent changes of exchange 
rate regime. Those changes are often untimely and call into question the independence of 
monetary policy. In its original form, Tobin’s tax is essentially a permanent, uniform, ad 
valorem tax on international capital flows. The basic ratio of the Tobin tax is to expand and 
strengthen the autonomy of domestic monetary policy, whose successful implementation 
does not depend on combating financial instability. Its implementation is conditioned by 
the acts of the world's leading banks and the structure of tax jurisdictions. Hypothetically 
speaking, the "introduction" of this tax system could take place as follows: "First of all, 
you should keep one important world conference, something like a mini-Breton Woods to 
get an agreement about his legal beings. Administrator surely would be the International 
Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements, or some new agency authorized by the 
signatory countries of the contract. Their jurisdiction would be to determine the tax rate de 
lege artis and ensure uniform application of tax by all the signatory countries. Also they will 
determine the tax exemption, which should be justified by valid reasons. The International 
Monetary Fund would be deprived of some of its central authority established by the Breton 
Woods monetary system and replaced by the European regional regime, but should 
nevertheless welcome their new responsibilities resulting in introduction of taxes" (Tobin, 
1996: 493-496).  
Tobin argued that this tax should be applied in a progressive method of distribution of 
revenue collected, which would enable small and underdeveloped countries to hold most 
of the tax revenue collected in their territory. The explanation of this dedicated disposal 
income is in the fact that such a mechanism can ensure global tax system and stop a possible 
decision not to participate in the "reinforcement" of the Tobin tax. As the load imposed by this 
tax is inversely proportional to the duration of a transaction, it follows that the shorter the 
duration of the transaction, the greater the tax burden. For example, the Tobin tax in the 
amount of 0.25% generates a two-day annual turnover of capital income tax of 365 cents; 
in the opposite case, turnover generated by transactions that are conducted twice a year 
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yields revenue of only one cent (Bird, 1999: 230-233). The Tobin tax need not be 
introduced in the tax systems of all countries of the world; it is enough to apply it to those 
countries that are considered to be the largest tax centers. Thus, for example, in 1998, 
more than half of all transactions relating to capital movements were performed in the UK 
and USA. In order to prevent tax planning by taxpayers, it is necessary to broaden the tax 
base from the original spot of the proposed transaction onto all derivative products, such as 
futures contracts, options contracts, forward contracts. It is necessary to carry out further 
research to determine the optimal tax rate; although there is a general consensus that it 
should be determined by reducing the likelihood of tax evasion, it is proposed to be 
determined in the range between 0.1 and 0.25%. Even though the basic function of 
transaction tax is not fiscal, but is reflected in the reduction of the degree of financial 
instability, the revenues generated by transaction tax are by no means negligible. In 
particular, this issue may not be disregarded in the course of debating whether the IMF is 
able to provide sufficient resources to cope with the current financial crisis. Therefore, in 
those countries that have no high income per capita and where the volume of foreign 
exchange transactions is not high, Tobin’s tax could generate significant revenue in the 
budget to compensate for the existing deficit. Taxes on international financial transactions 
have a long and sometimes mutually different intellectual and factual history.  
3. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF CURRENCY TRANSACTION TAXES 
The focus of debate in a number of academic critical commentaries on the introduction 
of the Tobin tax is the implementation of tax and legal operations around its distortions 
effects on private decision-making (Korkut, 2010). Some authors believe that such a tax may 
not be considered as an optimal fiscal instrument (Lowell, Eatwell, 2000) and point out to 
many more effective ways to reduce volatilities problems in the market. The American 
theorist Davidson examines the Keynes theory in this light, specifying that transaction costs 
are amortized by financial instability (Davidson, 1998: 639-662). In his opinion, these costs 
deepen the instability rather than reduce it. In his criticism, he highlights that the main function 
of a financial market is to provide liquidity; the markets in which there are no way-out barriers 
are more stable than others; thus, the reduction of the number of foreign exchange transactions 
is not the solution to financial instability because it increases transaction costs. Although 
Davidson is partially right, it seems that he has not taken into account the potential of the Tobin 
tax, which affects the speed at which market participants adjust prices (Davidson, 2009: 671-
686). Let's leave aside the question whether such a tax is per se sufficient to reduce the 
opportunities for speculative transactions or whether it is accompanied by other fiscal 
instruments in this endeavour. Note that the partial implementation of the Tobin tax (only by 
some countries in the world) would not be sufficient to achieve the desired goals because it 
would yield too much space for lawful exercise of illegitimate tax evasion. Political consensus 
is a prerequisite for the introduction of tax, but it would be difficult for some states to give up 
their status of "tax havens". Even if the Tobin tax were introduced on a global scale, it would be 
extremely difficult to charge and collect tax assets which could be used for reducing the market 
instability. The American economist Friedman argued that speculators actually try to 
stabilize the market through rational pricing arbitrage and thus contribute to the liquidity 
of the capital. When prices are below their equilibrium level (fair value), speculators will 
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make a decision about their purchase in order to raise the level of market equilibrium; on 
the other hand, when prices are above the equilibrium level, they make the decision to sell 
to their descent to the level of equilibrium (Friedman, 1953). 
Critics also point out that the restricted funds of tax revenues are contrary to the 
principle of generality, which further raises the question who would control such restricted 
funds. Experience with partially introduced transactional taxes is contradictory. The 
introduction of this tax in Sweden only contributed to increasing the capital market volatility 
while the use of transaction tax on securities reduced the market volatility, having in mind 
the adverse effect of reducing the number of transactions (Umlauf, 1993: 227-240). The 
greatest opponents of introducing the Tobin tax were members of the US Senate. By 
enacting the 1996 Prohibition on the United Nations Taxation Act, the US Senate endeavored 
to prevent the officers of UN agencies in concretizing the Tobin Tax and all other taxes on 
international financial transactions (Korkut, 2006: 71). For members of the Senate, this tax was 
not acceptable due to its potential to strengthen the national economies and evenly 
distribute the tax burden among countries in the world. It was felt that "this tax was against the 
current tide underlying the liberalization of financial flows, globalization and the reduction 
of fiscal burdens to achieve general social welfare" (Raffer, 1998: 529-538). It is interesting that 
this unilateral ban on the UN Tax Act was very effective. Thus, in the process of deciding on 
the introduction of these taxes, the senators left their copies of James Tobin’s book unopened; 
namely, after the adoption of the ban imposed by the U.S. Senate, packages of previously 
ordered books were still untouched. 
The misunderstanding of the purpose of imposing transaction taxes by the US tax system 
administration does not come as a surprise considering that most of the tax burden is borne by 
domestic taxpayers. In addition to its core function to reduce financial instability, the Tobin tax 
contributes to exercising the principle of vertical equity, which implies that taxpayers of greater 
economic power should shoulder most of the tax burden. Most of the legal and economic facts 
included in the base of the Tobin tax emerged in the US economic market, which makes the 
resistance of the US tax administration quite expected. Resistance stems from the 
understanding that the application of transactional taxes will increased the risk premium; 
therefore, the higher the risk premium, the higher the potential of financial instability. This 
is explained by the fact that the financial costs of equipment are significantly decreased in 
periods of crisis and increased in period of prosperity, which would influence the market 
participants decision on the purchase or sale of assets (Bernstein, 1998: 15-24) Today, this 
argument cannot be accepted because it emphasizes that the currency transaction tax can have a 
negative impact on the overall systemic risk which exists in the stock market regardless of the 
number and volume of transactions; thus, the impact of the currency transaction tax is reflected 
in reducing specific risks which also determine the stock price. 
4. MODIFICATION ON CURRENCY TRANSACTION TAXES 
Due to the mentioned shortcomings in transaction tax, it has been necessary to make 
certain modifications. Hence, the English theorist Span modifies the original Tobin tax by 
proposing the introduction of two-tier tax structure. This means that, in standard market 
conditions, a minimum (possibly zero) tax fee should be charged on all foreign exchange 
transactions; however, in the circumstances when the exchange rate exceeds the predetermined 
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amount, the so-called extra tax benefits should be charged, which would reduce the 
performance of speculative transactions (Spahn, 1996). The proposed two-tier tax structure on 
foreign exchange transactions is considered ideal for developing countries which may thereby 
opt for the exchange rate regime in the form of a currency board or dollarization regime (i.e. 
Europeanization), which implies that the independence of domestic monetary policy is largely 
restrictive. Hence, we may wonder where the practical effect of the Tobin tax lies. The basic 
principle would be as follows: as long as the daily fluctuations are low, the fiscus should apply a 
more lenient tax rate. If the daily fluctuations are recovered from the determined value, a more 
stringent tax rate should be applied (Bruno, 2003: 56). This principle resembles the two-tier 
tax structure proposed by Span. However, it is believed that the more lenient tax rate ranges 
from 0.05 to 0.01 %, because banks are the only economic agents that undertake transactions 
on the foreign exchange market. As the fee that banks charge for interbank transactions in 
the euro-dollar at the average level of 0.01%, the tax rate should be at the same level, if not 
lower? (Spahn, 2002: 15-16) It is considered that the tax rate should be higher still (at least 
0.1%) because banks charge commission fee on clients such as the powerful transnational 
companies and different types of funds.  
Tax exemptions should be allowed only when bank clients appear as households and 
small businesses whose transactions do not exceed a predetermined amount. The main 
function of such a tax would be determined as exclusively fiscal; according to some 
calculations, the total sum of collected revenue would amount to 16 billion U.S. dollars. 
Thus, the foreign exchange transactions tax is expected to work as follows: "the increase 
in national currency exchange rate above the predetermined norm would inspire agents to 
expect future increases, because they recognize the effect of the Tobin tax on market 
activities, which would increase the same" (Arestis, Soyer, 1997: 760). Thus, for example, 
Harcourt believed that the primary role of the Tobin tax is to prevent the domination of any 
part of the financial market caused by speculative capital flows which are undesirable 
because they "distort prices"; for this reason, such prices  do not fit the picture of economic 
reality, and the market is doomed to failure (Harcourt, 2003: 15-16) He thought it was 
necessary to narrowing the circle of taxpayers in the sense that those market participants who 
engaged in legitimate business transactions that improve market performance should not be 
taxed. These participants fall into the category of fair traders, as compared to the speculative 
traders whose activities do not improve market efficiency. The Tobin tax is viewed as an 
institutional aspect which reduces market uncertainty by changing the expectations of 
participants in the transactions. Accordingly, it means that the Tobin tax achieves the same 
function as the policy of holding prudential reserves by commercial banks (Randall, 2002). 
Taxes on foreign currency transactions at home and abroad can be effective only if 
requirements are cumulatively met and reflected in the business, making it relatively easy 
and cheap to use the existing infrastructure and market networks, capturing the vast majority 
of foreign exchange transactions in the global market, and setting tax rates at relatively low 
level in order to reduce distorts effects and avoid the effect of excessive tax burden (Schmit, 
2001: 199-212) The main objection to the two-tier tax on international currency transactions 
is that the tax rate is too high for normal market activity and too low when it comes to 
serious speculative attacks. But, what if the tax rate in times of peace is really high? In 
accordance with the "principle of leaving the hot potato" when the dealer receives a 
certain amount of foreign exchange by the buyer, if the dealer considers that the retention 
would be too expensive and risky, the endeavor to resell to another buyer or dealer 
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(whereby the reselling chain can include more than five participants) stimulates market 
fairness. As all transactions are now electronically performed, transaction costs tend to zero. 
Of course, in the ideal world, the Tobin tax could destroy the market because it would 
prevent resale. This critique cannot be accepted. First of all, transaction costs were high 
during the 1970s and 1980s and did not constitute a hindrance when performing transactions. 
Also, the critique did not take into account the fact that the functioning of foreign exchange 
market has changed dramatically in terms of reducing interdealer transaction (Dodd, Ibid). This 
decrease can be explained by a process of consolidation of the banking industry and the 
advancement of electronic commerce. The opponents of the Tobin tax propose the introduction 
of capital controls as an alternative and less expensive solution. But, if one’s ambitions are 
limited to those reforms that are easy to achieve, then the scope of one’s ambition expands 
even more because our opponents are less involved in debating about what is politically and 
economically efficient solution in the neoliberal world. 
5. CURRENCY TRANSACTION TAXES ADVOCATES 
International foreign exchange transaction taxes were the subject matter of consideration 
in many conferences held in developed countries. The most notable one is the conference 
"New Rules for Global Finances", held in May 2003 in Washington D.C. The main 
recommendations of the conference participants concerned the acceptance of the underlying 
tax as a primary component of the "financial architecture development, understood in terms 
of financial system that promotes equity with a stable and sustainable economic progress" 
(Grabel, 2003). There has been a proposal for a joint implementation of the Tobin Tax 
(viewed in the narrow sense as a tax on currency conversion) and securities transaction 
taxes, due to the attitude taken as to their cohesive effect of easing the financial demands 
concerning a growing instability in terms of public debt.  
In assessing the effectiveness of the Tobin tax, many theorists ask whether speculation 
actually occur in the market. Although this question seems naive to consider, neither the banks 
nor large consumers (multinational companies, insurance companies, pension funds) are 
deemed to carry out speculative transactions. They perceive them as appropriate transactions, 
for which reason all income should be included without exception in taxable income. 
Therefore, the fiscal literature considers that, in the performance of speculative activities, 
vendors provide services to all customers and satisfy their preferences only when other vendors 
do not want to accept the risk. It is therefore considered that, when large speculative attack 
intensity causes a devaluation of domestic currency, it is the overall responsibility of the 
governments of the affected countries to bear the burden, rather than the market participants 
(Jetin, Ibid). In respect of the aforesaid, we can distinguish between speculations in the 
foreign exchange market that are considered standard, and speculations that influence the 
depreciation of the exchange rate and are often associated with financial crises.  
Considering the importance of speculation observed at shorter intervals, the foreign 
exchange market can be best understood on the basis of research conducted in the UK 
among the authorized dealers of foreign currency (Cheung, Menzie, 2000: 15-21). In that 
context, the participants are supposed to set aside the most important factor influencing 
the movement of the exchange rate and the observed over-reaction of customers of foreign 
currencies in relation to expectations and the so-called "bandwagon effect, which means 
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that each participant in the foreign exchange market follows the reactions of other 
participants, without any particular reason other than the simple fact that the first participant has 
taken some action. Thus, we come to the conclusion that speculations actually increase the 
level of equity by 81 percent and improve the efficiency of market structure by 74 
percent. In terms of globalization, the Tobin tax could serve as a sort of shield against the 
risks underlying the free movement of capital. In times of crisis, it can be combined with 
other capital controls measures.  
Although there is no consensus in the world on introducing Tobins tax, partial efforts 
may be observed in the tax legislation of some countries. Thus, in December 2001, the 
French Parliament adopted a legislative act that favors the tax on capital transactions. The 
act states that its implementation will start when the other EU member states ratify that act. 
The modified two-tier structure of the Tobin tax proposal was adopted by Belgium, whose 
implementation will start upon ratification. In Italy, the introduction of this tax revenue 
requires approval of at least 30,000 thousand taxpayers. On the other hand, the proponents 
of the Tobin tax believe that each state could charge tax on the conversion of domestic 
currency without any constraints and no matter where the transaction is carried out in the 
world. It is believed that the implementation of this tax has been transparent and cost-
effective, considering the use of latest technology in modern transactions. Supporters 
perceive the progressive effect of transaction tax as an advantage because, otherwise, all 
market participants should proportionally bear the same tax burden, including the so-
called "noise traders" engaged in speculative activities (Summers, Summers, 1989: 163-
188) The problem associated with the implementation of the Tobin tax can be analyzed as 
follows: 1) if the Tobin tax imposed by government cannot be enforced, it will not be 
effective; 2) if the Tobin tax was introduced by the government, which ensured the 
enforcement, then it will be the desired result. The second objection is directly related to 
the huge profits gained, for example, by Microsoft and other leading companies which 
enjoy legal monopoly on the basis of softer patent law due to the political willingness of the 
local government and guarantees providing full protection of their intellectual property 
rights. This example shows that, if there is political will for full protection of these rights 
(which is much harder to achieve than to allow the implementation of the Tobin tax), then it 
is also possible to successfully charge taxes on capital transaction (Baker, 2003). Yet, critics 
who suggest that the Tobin tax actually distorts taxpayers’ behavior disregard the fact that 
taxes on securities trading, which are charged at a much steeper tax rates, have no such 
effects (Habermeier, Kirilenko, 2003). Arguably, the application of the Tobin tax decreases 
the transaction costs of bona fides traders in the market. After imposing this tax, transaction 
costs would be lower than they were decades ago. If market designers are able to operate in 
such conditions, it is logical for them to proceed with their business activities in the 
circumstances generated by introducing Tobins tax (Paley, 2003). Although the initial 
application of the Tobin tax has increased the amount of transaction costs, eventually the 
costs would drop to the level prior to imposing Tobin’s tax (if not lower) because this tax 
would reduce the volatility caused by speculative financial transactions mala fides.  
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6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The ratio of currency transaction taxes is justified in terms of financing increased 
public expenditures, because these revenues represent an excellent tool for solving tax 
competition problems, as a characteristic feature of modern finance. Also, in inflation 
periods, due to the total reduction of collected tax revenues (Tanzi effect), the currency 
transaction taxes perform the function of the inflationarys tax which is aimed at protecting 
the living standard of vulnerable social groups because it is collected from taxpayers of 
greater economic power. The proponents of transaction taxes should not give up their fight 
and must not sacrifice the public interests to the interest of the market; even though the state 
is commonly said to be an equal market partner, the state intervention is irreplaceable. As for 
the collection of these taxes, it is necessary to expand the capacity of the existing tax 
administration, taking into consideration the time required for training tax officers in 
accounting and collecting new taxes, and related costs/expenses which are often in conflict 
with the principle of cost-efficiency and taxpayers’ convenience in terms of tax compliance. 
Therefore, these goals may be achieved through coherent cooperation between the state and 
taxpayer associations, which have to join their effort to raise taxpayers’ awareness of the 
need and importance of introducing the Tobin tax. 
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ULOGA POREZA NA DEVIZNE TRANSAKCIJE 
U SMANJIVANJU FINANSIJSKE NESTABILNOSTI 
Porez na devizne transakcije predstavlja jedini fiskalni instrument koji je u stanju da napravi 
kompromis između potpuno slobodnog i snažno uređenog međunarodnog finansijskog tržišta, jer se 
njime nadomeštavaju nedostaci oba sistema uz istovremeno prihvatanje njihovih komparativnih 
prednosti. Krize na međunarodnom finansijkom tržištu mogu biti prouzrokovane brojnim faktorima 
kakvi su moralni hazard, negativna selekcija i promena očekivanja. Upravo se strah od nametanja 
poreza na devizne transakcije može javiti kao jedan od faktora, koji produbljuje već postojeću krizu, te 
se zato on mora uvoditi u poreski sistem postepeno vodeći računa o ukupnom poreskom opterećenju. 
Bilo bi naivno posmatrati porez na devizne transakcije kao „čarobni štapić“ (panacea) za rešavanje 
svih finasijskih problema na tržištu, ignorišući pritom njegove nesavršenosti. Zbog neizvesnosti u 
primeni poreza na devizne transakcije, kao njegove alternative privremeno se nude poreski podsticaji 
kompanijama u cilju smanjenja potrošnje električne energije, korišćenje specijalnih prava vučenja od 
strane MMF-a i konstituisanje specijalnih fondova za osiguranje (Reisen). Takve alternative bi 
trebalo prihvatiti, barem privremeno, dok se ne postigne konsenzus o optimalnom obliku oporezivanja 
deviznih transakcija i dok on kao takav ne dostigne svoju fiskalnu funkciju. Takođe, za ubiranje ovog 
poreza neophodno je proširiti kapacitet postojećih poreskih administracija, uzeti u obzir vreme 
neophodno za osposobljavanje poreskih službenika za obračunavanje i naplatu novog poreza kao i 
njihove trošove koji su često u suprotnosti sa načelom jeftinoće i ugodnosti plaćanja poreza od strane 
poreskih obveznika. Konačno, treba imati u vidu da svaki novi porez sa sobom nosi i latentnu 
opasnost produbljivanja kontrole građana od strane državnih organa  usled podnošenja potrebnih 
poreskih informacija. Zbog svega napred spomenutog postoji realna i logična potreba da se kroz 
koherentnu saradnju države i udruženja poreskih obveznika radi na podizanju svesti poreskih 
obveznika o nužnosti i značaju uvođenja  poreza na devizne transakcije.  
U finansijskoj literaturi postoje suštinske nedoslednosti u shvatanju samog zakonskog bića poreza  
na devizne transakcije. U tom smilsu se moramo zapitati da li se poreski predmet odnosi isključivo na 
devizne transakcije ili na sve finansijske transakcije; da li je u određivanju visine poreske stope uzeta 
u obzir kontrolna uloga centralnih banaka i da li implementacija poreza znači sužavanje obima 
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finansijskog tržišta; šta se dešava nakon što se umanji finansijska nestabilnost svetskog tržišta i da li 
se porezom na devizne transakcije nepovratno menja struktura dospeća javnog duga (Gresgraber). 
Razgraničenje u odgovorima na postavljena pitanja zahteva seriozno angažovanje stručnjaka iz 
oblasti fiskalne politike, ekonomskog i monetranog prava, jer su upravo ti odgovori conditio sine qua 
non  optimalnog uvođenja i primene poreza na devizne transakcije. 
Ključne reči: porezi, devizne transakcije, finansijska nestabilnost,fiskalna izdašnost, fiskalna politika, 
poreska pravičnost.  
